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Abstract
In this paper, we disentangle the effects of new information from the effects of personal
experience to describe how personal experience changes behavior. We examine personal
experience with one of the most ubiquitous managerial and policy tools: the monetary
fine. We demonstrate that experience with a fine, controlling for the effect of learning
new information, significantly boosts future compliance. We also show that experience
with a large fine boosts compliance more than experience with a small fine, but that the
influence of experience with both large and small fines decays sharply over time. We
report longitudinal analyses of approximately 10,000 video-rental customers over a
period of two years. We show that direct experience with a late fee significantly
decreases the likelihood that customers will incur a late fee during their next rental. This
is true even for renters who had incurred a late fee for a prior rental and had complete
information about the late-fee policy. Our findings have broad implications for
understanding how information and experience influence behavior over time.

Experience and behavior 3
Size matters (and so does experience):
How personal experience with a fine influences behavior

After renting the movie ‗Apollo 13,‘ Reed Hastings misplaced his video cassette.
He found the cassette six weeks later and faced a $40 late fee. The experience of paying
this late fee was so aversive for Hastings, that it motivated him to take an action that
would fundamentally change the entire video-rental industry: In 1997, Hastings founded
Netflix (Zipkin, 2006).
Even though Hastings was aware of the late-fee policy, it was the experience of
paying the fine that motivated him to change his behavior. In this paper, we examine the
unique influence of personal experience on subsequent behavior.
Economic models of behavior assume that new information changes behavior
(e.g., Becker, 1968; 1976). These models have considered the content and reliability of
new information, but have largely ignored the influence of how new information is
obtained. Recent work, however, has found that how individuals receive information
matters. In particular, an emerging body of research suggests that information gained
from experience may be particularly influential (e.g., Simonsohn, Karlsson, Loewenstein
& Ariely, 2008; Harvey & Fischer, 2005; Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004; Barron & Erev,
2003). For example, a prospective diner may be more likely to avoid a restaurant after
experiencing poor service there than after reading a review of the poor service others
have had at that restaurant.
Several scholars, however, have argued that much of the extant research that
examines how personal experience changes behavior has confounded how information is
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acquired with the nature of information acquired (e.g., Rakow, Demes & Newell, in
press; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Fox & Hadar, 2006). For example, the experience of
being arrested may deter criminals from reoffending (e.g., Smith & Gartin, 1989). It is
not clear, however, whether the experience itself (i.e., the personal experience of getting
arrested) or new information (e.g., new information about the subjective probability of
being caught) deters crime.
In the current work, we explore how experience influences behavior. We
introduce a novel methodological approach to disentangle the effects of learning new
information from the effects of personal experience. We examine experience with one of
the most ubiquitous policy tools—the monetary fine. We demonstrate that personal
experience with a fine powerfully influences behavior. This is true even when people
have complete information. Our results also describe the mechanics of the relationship
between experience and future behavior. We show that larger fines change behavior more
than smaller fines, and we show that the effects of personal experience with a fine decay
quickly over time.
Information and Behavior
In this paper, we disentangle the effects of experience from the effects of
information. Information campaigns are often used to change individual behavior, and an
extensive body of research suggests that individuals, as rational actors, will respond to
new information (e.g., Prescott & Rockoff, 2008; Cutler, Huckman & Landrum, 2004; Jin
& Leslie, 2003; Nelson, 1974). For example, Cutler, Huckman and Landrum (2004)
found that the introduction of a hospital ―report card‖ system influenced patient
decisions; cardiac admissions fell by 10% at hospitals that received a ―high mortality‖
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label. Similarly, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that publicizing the hygiene ratings of Los
Angeles restaurants led consumers to shift their dining preferences in favor of the most
hygienic restaurants.
A surprising number of studies, however, have found that people are often
insensitive to information. For example, health workers in Africa claimed that ―we could
talk about germs until we were blue in the face, and it didn‘t change behavior‖ (Duhigg,
2008). In a different domain, college administrators tried to curtail alcohol consumption
by providing students with new information, but these attempts completely failed to
influence drinking behavior (Clapp et al., 2003). Other informational campaigns, ranging
from listing nutritional information of food in supermarkets to spreading awareness of the
hazards of smoking, have had only modest effects on behavior (McKenna & Williams,
1993; Russo et al., 1986).
These discrepant findings regarding the efficacy of providing individuals with
new information have prompted scholars to investigate conditions under which people
are more or less likely to react to new information. For example, Chu and Chu (1990)
found that feedback consistency is important in determining whether new information
will affect judgments and decisions. Others have considered how social-cognitive factors,
such as goals and norms, moderate the influence of new information (e.g., Cialdini, 2003;
Kunda, 1990). More recent work has begun to consider how the mode of communication
moderates the influence of new information.
In practice, people can learn information in several different ways. For example, a
driver may learn about the hazards of receiving a speeding ticket by hearing someone tell
a story about how she received a fine for speeding (information via description), by
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witnessing another driver receive a fine for speeding (information via observation), or by
actually receiving a fine for speeding (information via personal experience). Each of
these sources (description, observation, or personal experience) may convey the same
factual information. Although most information studies (e.g., Di Tella & Schargrodsky,
2003; Kessler & Levitt, 1999) have focused on the informational content of the message
(e.g., whether or not an individual learns that she may face a $100 fine for speeding),
recent work suggests that the mode of communication matters (Simonsohn et al., 2008).
In particular, information gained from experience may be particularly powerful in
influencing judgments and behavior.
Experience
People often receive more information when they learn from experience.
Although different sources of information may convey the same factual content, personal
experience can convey affective information that other modes of communication lack
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For example, information learned from someone else‘s
description of receiving a speeding ticket may lack the affective (and typically awful)
feeling that is part of the experience of receiving a speeding ticket.
Even if the factual content is held constant, the addition of affective information
gained through experience may change how people react to new information. Prior work
has found that people often make mistakes when they forecast how they are likely to feel
about specific outcomes in the future (Mellers, 2000; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999;
Gilbert et al., 1998). While some research has found that individuals overpredict how
badly they will feel following negative outcomes (e.g., Mellers, 2000; Gilbert et al.,
1998), research using behavioral measures suggests that individuals may actually
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underpredict these negative emotions (e.g., Read & Loewenstein, 1999; ChristensenSzalanski, 1984, see also Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). Following a personal
experience, individuals may be able to improve their affective forecasts relative to the
forecasts individuals make following described or observational accounts. For example, a
driver who learns about someone else‘s speeding ticket may mispredict just how awful
she will feel when she receives a speeding ticket of her own.
Recent research has attempted to isolate the effects of personal experience from
other types of accounts. Much of this research contrasts the influence of information
gained from personal experience with the influence of information gained from a
description. This work has found that the informational source matters (e.g., Yechiam &
Busemeyer, 2005; Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004; Barron & Erev, 2003). For instance,
Hertwig et al. (2004) found that decision makers overweight small probabilities when
they are given the actual probability distribution, but underweight these same
probabilities when they gain information about the probability distribution from their
own experience. Even when people receive information from multiple sources (e.g.,
when an outcome is first described, then experienced; Yechiam, Barron & Erev, 2005;
Inzana et al., 1996) people tend to place a great deal of weight on their personal
experience.
While a growing body of evidence suggests that personal experience is important,
this work has routinely confounded the source of the information with the factual
information conveyed (Rakow, Demes & Newell, in press; Newell & Rakow, 2007; Fox
& Hadar, 2006; see Simonsohn et al., 2008 for an exception). For example, compared to
peers who might hear second hand accounts about street crime, victims of street crime are
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more likely to engage in actions to prevent future victimization (e.g., Skogan, 1987). It is
unclear, however, whether the personal experience of the crime adds only affective
information, or whether it adds factual information as well, such as information about the
subjective probability of being accosted. By confounding both affective and other types
of information, we cannot be sure that experience itself uniquely affects behavior.
The present research
In this paper, we describe how personal experience, controlling for new
information, changes behavior. We examine this question within the context of one of the
most ubiquitous policy tools: the monetary fine. We report results from a field setting
with approximately 10,000 customers who made video-rental decisions over a two-year
period.
We test the effects of personal experience with a late fee on future rental
behavior. Specifically, we examine how paying a late fee influences how punctual people
will be in returning their next rental. We use a semiparametric econometric method to
compare the behavior of renters who experience a late fee with those who do not while
controlling for individual-specific effects.
In this setting, the late-fee policy is simple and explicit, and we report analyses on
individuals who had and had not paid a late fee for a previous rental. In this way, we can
study the influence of experience in a domain in which the experience (of paying a late
fee) does not communicate new factual information.
Our dataset is longitudinal. This allows us both to control for individual
differences in experience-based behaviors and to explore how the effects of experience
decay over time. Our ability to look at individual-level effects helps us to make direct
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comparisons between described consequences (e.g., being informed of the late return
policy) and direct experience of these consequences (e.g., actually being assessed a late
fee).
We test four hypotheses. These hypotheses describe a specific set of relationships
between personal experience and subsequent behavior.
Experience curtails late returns. Our first hypothesis predicts that the experience
of paying a fine will influence how punctual an individual will be in returning their next
rental. We conceptualize the experience of paying a fine as having both an informational
and an affective component. That is, personal experience can provide individuals with
new information and trigger specific feelings. In our context, renters who return materials
late lose money and experience negative feelings.
The experience of paying a fine is associated with negative affect (Novemsky &
Kahneman, 2005; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Consistent with prior work (Read &
Loewenstein, 1999; Christensen-Szalanski, 1984), we expect renters in our sample to
mispredict affective experiences. Specifically, we expect renters to be surprised by the
negative affect they experience when they actually pay a fine.
Having experienced a fine, we expect renters to improve their affective forecasts.
Specifically, when forecasting the consequences of returning their next rental late,
individuals who experienced a fine will incorporate both the loss of money and the very
negative feelings associated with a late return. By accurately anticipating the negative
affect associated with paying a fine, we expect renters who returned a movie late in one
time period (and paid a fine) to be less likely to return a movie late on their subsequent
visit.
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Hypothesis 1: Individuals who incurred a late fee in one period will be more likely
to return their materials on time in future periods than will individuals who did
not incur a late fee.
The influence of experiences decays over time. Recent experiences are more
salient and more affectively charged than distant experiences (Hertwig et al., 2004;
Ariely, 1998; Varey & Kahneman, 1992). This is particularly true for negative
experiences. Although both positive and negative memories decay over time, the memory
of negative experiences decays particularly quickly (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1997).
The experience of paying a late fee triggers negative affect. We expect this
negative affect to influence subsequent behavior. Over time, however, we expect the
memory of negative experiences to decay and we expect the influence of experience on
behavior to decay. Specifically, we expect experience with a fine to influence short-term
behavior far more than it influences long-term behavior.
Hypothesis 2: The effects of personal experience on subsequent behavior will
decay over time.
Size matters. We expect larger fines to influence behavior more than smaller
fines. This is likely to be true for two reasons. First, although all losses are aversive,
larger losses are more painful than smaller losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As a
result, the discrepancy between anticipated and experienced negative affect will grow
with the size of the fine. The larger the late fee, the stronger the relationship between
experience and future behavior.
Second, larger fines are more salient than smaller fines. The salience of
information can influence behavior (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004), and as a result, we expect
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larger fines to influence behavior more than smaller fines. Taken together, we predict the
following:
Hypothesis 3: Compared to smaller fines, larger fines are more likely to decrease
the likelihood of a late return on a subsequent visit.
Expertise matters. Experts, those with high levels of experience in a specific
domain, are less susceptible to some cognitive and affective errors than are novices. For
example, in collectables markets, List (2003) found that market experience mitigated the
endowment effect. Experienced traders were less prone to the endowment effect than
were less-experienced traders.
In our context, we expect customers with a great deal of rental experience to be
less affected by late fees than less-experienced renters. Experienced renters are likely to
have paid late fees in the past, and are likely to have gained information about the
negative affect associated with paying a late fee. As a result, we expect experienced
renters to make more accurate affective predictions than less-experienced renters.
Hypothesis 4: The influence of experience with a late fee on future compliance
will be strongest for individuals with limited rental activity.
Study
Overview
We examine video rental behavior and compare the effects of described
information (the late fee policy) to information gained through personal experience
(actually paying a late fee) on future rental behavior. Using a semiparametric
econometric technique in order to control for unobserved individual-specific effects in
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the dynamic process, we test whether paying a late fee affects the propensity to return
videos late in future periods.
Data
We use a dataset on video store transactions received from a large, independent
video store in Northern California. The data set includes all transactions made by over
10,000 distinct customers during a two-year period from January 1st, 2003 through
December 31st, 2004.
Each observation involves the set of transactions by an individual on a given day.
For each observation, we have the account number, date, type of rental (new release,
etc.), rental cost, the amount of money paid to cover a late fee for a past rental, and
payment method (credit, cash, check, gift card). Using the account number, we are able to
follow the rental behavior for a given individual over the two-year period. We are unable
to identify which accounts have multiple users; the added noise with regard to who
actually receives the late fee makes for a more conservative test of our hypotheses.
The video store for which we have data classifies movies into two categories: new
and old releases. New releases have a one-day rental period while old releases are fiveday rentals. Each additional day beyond the rental period for which a movie is not
returned is associated with a late fee of $3.00 for new releases and $1.00 for old releases.
For each visit to the video store, we observe whether the customer paid money to cover a
late fee associated with a previous rental (as opposed to observing which movies were
returned late). The policy at this particular video store is that customers are asked to pay
any late fees accrued from the previous rental whenever attempting to rent videos. If a
customer returns a movie late and rents another movie in the same visit, they are asked at
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that time to pay the late fee. Thus, we associate paying a late fee in period t with movies
returned late in period t-1. Occasionally, customers will return a movie late and decide to
pay the late fee without renting any additional videos (2.6% of late fees are paid in this
manner). Because they did not rent a movie when they paid the late fee, it will be
impossible for them to have to pay a late fee during their subsequent visit. This behavior
would mechanically provide evidence in favor of a premium placed on personal
experience. To address this problem, we drop all observations which represent a visit to
the video store in which a late fee was paid but no movie was rented.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data. The average person in our
dataset rents 2.3 movies per visit and visits the video store 21 times during the two-year
period. The movies are returned late 14% of the time causing the average individual to
pay $16.50 in late fees over the two-year period.
Empirical Strategy
We use a semiparametric method for estimating dynamic, binary-response models
(Honore & Kyriazidou, 2000; Chamberlain, 1985; Cox, 1958). Ordinarily, a fixed effects
framework would be ideal to control for a situation in which there exists individual
heterogeneity. However, since a lagged dependent variable is used as an explanatory
variable, including dummy variables for each customer mechanically results in a negative
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (see Nickell, 1981). Unlike random-effects
estimators, our method imposes less structure on the estimation.
Following Chamberlain (1985), we examine sequences of rental behavior (e.g.,
101000 vs. 100100), where each number represents a visit to the movie store by a
customer. A 1 represents that a late fee has been paid and 0 represents the absence of a
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late fee. In order to control for unobserved effects, we compare sequences with equal
numbers of 1‘s and 0‘s, holding the initial and final observations constant. Within a
sufficiency class and in the absence of first-order state dependence, we would expect all
sequences of events to occur with equal probability. Thus, evidence of an effect of
personal experience will emerge if late fees occur less often following a late fee in
previous periods.
The intuition for this identification is clear. To illustrate, suppose we compare the
data series ‗101000‘ to the series ‗110000‘. Each series describes a customer who has
paid two late fees, but at different times: The first customer paid a late fee during the first
and third visit to the store, while the second customer paid a fine in the first and second
visits. If the first data series is found to be significantly more likely to occur than the
second, this would suggest that receiving a late fee causes renters to be less likely to
receive a late fee the following period. More generally, we are comparing individuals
who receive the same overall number of late fees over a six period series and simply
examining whether the order in which they receive these late fees varies in a systematic
fashion.
For our analysis, we generate sequences of six observations so that we can
estimate both first-order (i.e., behavior at period t) and second-order state dependence
(i.e., behavior at t + 1). We created this data set by extracting the first six observations for
each movie-rental customer and then continuing to extract the subsequent six
observations for each customer provided that six additional observations exist. After
obtaining these sequences, we further restricted the data set to include only the 44
sequences of six observations which are useful for the testing of state dependence. This
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procedure leaves us with 7,650 usable sequences of six observations. These sequences
represent movie-rental behavior for 2,735 distinct customers. Table 2 presents counts for
each of the 44 different sequences we used to test for first-order state dependence. A
comparison of the counts for sequences within a sufficiency class suggests that negative
state dependence is present in these data.
Results
We hypothesized that personal experience would have a larger effect on rental
behavior than would other sources of information (Hypothesis 1). We find support for
this hypothesis in our estimate of first-order state dependence (see Table 3),

.1067,

p < .01. This Logit coefficient can be used to calculate a marginal effect of paying a late
fee in period t on paying a late fee in period t+1. The marginal effect implies that an
individual is 1.3% (in absolute terms) less likely to pay a late fee during a visit if a late
fee was paid during the last visit. This represents an 8.8% reduction from mean late fee
rate of 14%.
We predicted that the effect of personal experience would decay over time
(Hypothesis 2). In Table 3, we report estimates of second-order state dependence using
the 1,648 sequences that include sets of rentals involving a late return followed by an ontime return. An example of two types of sequences that can be used to test for secondorder state dependence is ‗101000‘ and ‗100100‘; second-order state dependence (the
effect of paying a late fee in period t on compliance in t+2) predicts the second series to
be more likely to occur than the first. Our estimate,

2

.0510, suggests that having

paid a late fee two visits ago decreases the probability of paying a late fee during the
current visit by 0.6% (4.3% reduction from the base rate of 14%). However, given the
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reduced sample size for testing second-order state dependence, this effect is not
significantly different from zero (p = .27).
In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that larger fines influence behavior more than
smaller fines. We test this hypothesis by comparing behavior across two types of
sequences: Sequences that involved small late fees (fees between $1 and $3, which are
typically caused by returning one movie past the deadline by one day), and sequences
that involve large late fees (fees greater than $3; in these sequences the average late fee
was $8.24).
We also restrict the samples for this analysis to sequences of six observations for
which there were two late fees. In these sequences, the amount of the first late fee might
influence subsequent late fee behavior. In sequences with multiple late fees, the
sufficiency classes that test for first-order state dependence (e.g. 111000 vs. 110100) may
not depend on the late fee amount in the first period. We report our analyses in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 3. We find that the experience with a large fine influences behavior
almost twice as strongly (

.1313) as does experience with a small fine (

.0775).

Expertise
We hypothesized that the experience of paying a fine would influence behavior
more for individuals with limited rental histories than it would for individuals with long
rental histories (Hypothesis 4). To test this hypothesis, we conducted separate analyses on
populations with different rental histories. Specifically, we conducted analyses on
customers who had previously rented at least 10, 20, and 40 times, respectively. We
report results from these analyses in Table 4. We estimate the level of first-order negative
state dependence in the data. Our results indicate that experience-based behavior is just as
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strong (if not stronger) for customers with long histories than it is for customers with
short histories. Contradicting our fourth hypothesis, we find that experience with a fine
influenced both seasoned and naïve renters alike.
Prior Experience with a Fine
We conducted an even more conservative test of our primary thesis. In Table 4
(columns 4, 5, and 6), we report analyses for customers who had previously paid at least
2, 4, or 10 late fees. Notably, we find the same first-order effects for experience with a
fine for customers who had paid a fine in the past.
Other behavioral effects
Our analyses focus on the relationship between experience with a late fee and
whether or not customers return their next rentals on time or late. It is quite possible the
experience with a late fee may influence other types of behavior as well (as it did for
Reed Hastings).
In considering other types of behavior, we first test to see if individuals who paid
a late fee decided not to visit the video store as often or decided to rent fewer movies on
subsequent visits. Since a lagged dependent variable does not enter into the model
anymore, we are able to use fixed effects to control for individual heterogeneity. As the
dependent variables (days between rentals and movies rented) are both counts, we present
fixed effects results from both OLS and Poisson models.
As we report in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, after controlling for unobserved
individual heterogeneity, paying a late fee is associated with an individual waiting 0.73
additional days before returning to the video store to rent another movie. This
relationship appears to decay quickly over time. Paying a late fee two periods ago
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continues to be associated with a statistically significant longer waiting time before
returning to the video store (0.48 days). However, paying a late fee three visits ago does
not have a statistically significant effect on the number of days between rentals. In
columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, we report results that test whether paying a late fee
reduces the number of videos that the customer will rent during their subsequent visit.
While the point estimates are all negative (customers rent fewer videos after paying a late
fee), this relationship was not significant.
General Discussion
Personal experience changes behavior. Using a unique field setting and
longitudinal data, we show that the personal experience of paying a late fee decreases the
likelihood that customers will incur a late fee during their next rental period. Larger fines
lead to greater behavioral effects than smaller fines, and recent experience matters. The
influence of experience with a fine decays quickly over time. Surprisingly, personal
experience affected the behavior of seasoned and novice renters alike. This was true even
for customers who had previously paid fines. This provides powerful evidence in support
of our thesis: the influence of personal experience extends beyond the factual information
it conveys.
Our work makes a substantial contribution to the growing literature linking
personal experience to cognition and behavior. Our methodological approach enables us
to pinpoint the effects of direct experience in a context where the costs and benefits of
either learning or failing to learn from experience are real. A particular benefit of our
approach is that we observe actual behaviors rather than relying on surveys or selfreports.
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Another strength of the current research lies in the longitudinal nature of our data.
Aside from the benefits in terms of controlling for individual-specific effects, examining
the effects of personal experience over time enables us to conduct the most conservative
test of the influence of personal experience on behavior to date. In contrast to findings
from laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that personal experience can affect
behavior days or even weeks into the future. In light of the conservative nature of our
tests, the effects of personal experience on behavior appear to be quite robust.
Our findings have implications for understanding information acquisition, both in
workplace and educational settings. A substantial literature has developed comparing the
efficacy of ―passive‖ learning (e.g., learning through lectures or textbooks) to processes
that give the learner more direct control and experience, such as experiential (Kolb, 1984)
or active learning (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; 2002). While the optimal information
source may depend on the type of information being communicated (e.g., Ostroff &
Kozlowski, 1992), research suggests that approaches offering learners a chance to
experience information rather than simply absorb it often result in better performance in
terms of adaptive learning and other relevant outcomes (e.g., Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006; see
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001 for a review). While passive and active learning
approaches can vary greatly in the amount and type of information that they convey, the
results we present here are consistent with the idea that learning through experience
makes the information more salient and memorable.
Our findings inform a number of practical prescriptions. Across many domains,
managers use fines to gain compliance. For example, managers not only impose fines to
curtail smoking at work, but also to encourage healthy behaviors outside of work by
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fining employees who fail to meet specific health criteria (Costello, 2007). Our findings
suggest that following a personal experience with a fine, employees will be particularly
likely to comply with the desired behavior. Policies that regularly impose small fines are
likely to be particularly effective in gaining compliance.
In other cases, managers may wish to minimize the salience of fees they charge.
Many businesses, such as credit-card companies, rely on various fees and penalties as a
major source of income. These businesses may wish to implement policies that reduce the
salience of the fees they charge to increase customer retention and satisfaction.
Automatic withdrawal or prepaid late-fee accounts may reduce the impact of personal
experience with a fine.
Our findings also inform prescriptions for public policy. For example,
policymakers may be able to deter crime not only by adjusting punishment levels and
detection rates, but also by changing the personal experience of potential criminals.
Rather than giving a juvenile caught vandalizing a warning, an officer may deter future
crime more effectively by meting out a punishment that involves a personal experience
(e.g. briefly handcuffing the offender).
Conclusion
When it comes to motivating individuals, personal experience offers a unique
vehicle for changing behavior. Importantly, personal experience even influences
seasoned individuals with prior experience. Though we found that compliance effects
decay over time, personal experience with a fine can motivate long-term behavior. In
some cases, the influence of these changes can be profound. Just ask Reed Hastings and
his competitors at Blockbuster.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics - By Individual
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

Min

Max

Visits (2-year period)

21.4

29.6

9

1

320

Avg Movies Rented (per visit)

2.3

1.1

2

1

12

Fraction of Time Movies are
Returned Late

0.14

0.20

0.04

0

1

Late Fees Paid ($, per visit,
conditional on paying a late fee)

4.24

3.34

3.3

1

44

Late Fees Paid ($, 2-year period)

16.5

45.1

2

0

1335

10563

10563

10563

10563

10563

Total Number of Customers

Notes: Summary statistics represent data from all video-store transactions made between Jan. 1, 2003 – Dec.
31, 2004. A visit represents all transactions that take place on a given day by a customer account number.
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Table 2. Counts of Different Sequence Types
Used For Testing First-order State Dependence
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

110000
101000
100100
100010

266
307
317
288

(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)

011100
001110
010110
011010

114
117
146
149

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

000011
010001
000101
001001

287
322
339
345

(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)

111100
111010
110110
101110

59
74
82
85

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

011000
001100
000110
001010
010010
010100

300
330
341
328
346
347

(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)

001111
011101
010111
011011

87
75
83
101

(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

111000
110100
110010
100110
101100
101010

103
120
123
125
128
137

(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)

100111
110011
111001
110101
101101
101011

71
80
82
70
77
100

(21)
000111
123
(22)
001011
112
(23)
010011
135
(24)
011001
137
(25)
001101
138
Total No.
(26)
010101
154
of Sequences:
7650
Notes: Each sequence type represents six consecutive visits by the same
individual. 1’s indicate that a late fee was paid during that visit and 0’s
indicate no late fee paid. Types (1) – (44) illustrate all sequences of six
visits that are usable to test for first-order state dependence. Sequence
types are separated into groups ((1)-(4), (5)-(8), etc.) which represent a
given sufficiency class. The third and sixth columns provide counts for
the number of times the sequence occurs in our data.
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Table 3. Fixed-Effects Estimates of State Dependence - Based on
Semiparametric Conditional Logit Models

Paid Fee (t-1)

Dependent Variable: Paid Fee in Period (t)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.1067
-0.0775
-0.1313
(.0237)**
(.0416)†
(.0499)*

Paid Fee(t-2)

-0.0510
(.0464)

First of Two Paid Fees $1-$3

X

First of Two Paid Fees > $3

X

Log Likelihood

-18661

-1142

-6638

-3633

Total No. Observations

45900

9888

16614

9216

Total No. Chains of Six
7650
1648
2769
1536
Notes: Columns (1) – (4) provide maximum likelihood estimates of state dependence using the conditional
log-likelihood functions given in Equations (9) and (11) – Equation (9) represents first-order state dependence
and Equation (11) represents second-order state dependence. Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap
routine with 1000 repetitions of full samples with replacement. Column (3) uses the subset of sequences which
have exactly two late fees and where the first late fee paid is between $1 and $3. Column (4) uses the subset of
sequences which have exactly two late fees and where the first late fee paid is greater than $3.
† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 4. Estimating the Effects of Experience on First-Order State Dependence

Paid Fee (t-1)

Dependent Variable: Paid Fee in Period (t)
Number of Previous Visits
Number of Previous Late Fees
>10
>20
>40
>2
>5
>10
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.1540
-0.1238
-0.2227
-0.1127
-0.1803
-0.1674
(.0281)**
(.0327)**
(.0445)**
(.0284)**
(.0333)**
(.0411)**

First
Half
(7)
-0.1493
(.0398)**

Second
Half
(8)
-0.1118
(.0386)**

Log Likelihood

-13451

-9859

-5456

-13620

-9736

-6010

-7131

-7157

Total No. Observations

33042

24300

13446

33690

24078

14784

17580

17580

Total No. Chains of Six
5507
4050
2241
5615
4013
2464
2930
2930
Notes: Columns (1) – (8) provide maximum likelihood estimates of state dependence using the conditional log-likelihood functions given in Equation (9) in the text.
Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap routine with 1000 repetitions of full samples with replacement. Columns (1) – (3) restrict the sample by not creating
sequences of six observations for each individual until the first 10, 20, and 40 visits to the video store have been deleted, respectively. Columns (4) – (6) restrict the
sample by not creating sequences of six observations until the individual has paid 2, 5, and 10 late fees, respectively. Column (7) restricts the sample by only including
the first half of sequences for any individual. Column (8) restricts the sample by only including the second half of sequences for any individual. In the event of an odd
number of sequences for a given individual, the last sequence is deleted.
† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 5. The Effect of Receiving a Late Fee on Time Between Rental
Periods and Movies Rented Per Visit - OLS and Poisson Models
Dependent Variable: Number of
days between movie rental (t) and
movie rental (t-1)

Dependent Variable: Number of
movies rented during visit t

OLS

Poisson

OLS

Poisson

Late Fee (t-1)

0.732
(.153)**

0.051
(.010)**

-0.015
(.010)

-0.006
(.003)†

Late Fee (t-2)

0.477
(.150)**

0.034
(.010)**

-0.009
(.010)

-0.004
(.004)

Late Fee (t-3)

0.247
(.152)

0.019
(.012)

-0.017
(.010)

-0.007
(.004)†

Individual F.E.

X

X

X

X

Observations
198,174
198,174
198,174
198,174
Notes: In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is a count of the number of days between the current
movie-rental visit (visit t) and the last time that the customer rented a movie (visit t-1). In Columns (3) and (4),
the dependent variable is a count of the total number of movies that the customer rented in the current movierental visit (visit t). Columns (1) and (3) use ordinary least squares with customer fixed effects. Robust standard
errors for these columns are presented in parentheses. Columns (2) and (4) run a Poisson conditional fixed
effects model. Bootstrapped standard errors for these columns are presented in parentheses.
† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

